

STILL A RIGHT-WING MONOPOLY?

IDEOLOGY AND SPANISH NATIONAL IDENTITY¹

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Introduction

Despite the continuous existence of a liberal and progressive strand of Spanish nationalism, all over the 20th century in Spain there has been an enduring identification between the right-wing [traditionalist, conservative, reactionary or fascist] sectors of the Spanish society and the Spanish nationalism. Perhaps this identification reached its summit with the francoist dictatorship, that could be described as the “greatest nationalist experience and the most ambitious project of integral nationalization for 20th century Spain” (Saz, 2003:48).

The crucial element, though, is that the Francoist regime, during its forty years of existence, operated a process of *monopolization of patriotism* (Bar-Tal, 1997). The monopolization of patriotism is a quite common practice by many authoritarian regimes that consists on the identification between the regime and its ideological principles, and the nation itself. The francoist monopolization of patriotism implied the self-representation of the regime as the incarnation of the nation’s true values and interests, as well as the stigmatization of the political

¹ This paper is an excerpt and adaptation of the 7th chapter of my doctoral dissertation *From National Catholicism to Democratic Patriotism? An Empirical Analysis of Contemporary Spanish National Identity*

opposition as the 'anti-Spain' representing the interests of an international conspiracy of the nation's enemies.

Probably as a consequence of this monopolization, the majority of the left wing and democratic opposition felt alienated, to different degrees, from the very idea of a Spanish nation. The opposition refrained from explicitly nationalistic affirmations (Nuñez-Seixas, 2001).

This alienation, to which the symbolic opposition between the republican and monarchic/francoist national symbols greatly contributed, proved consequential especially during the transition to democracy and the first years of the new democratic regime. Indeed, some analysts, as well as many ideologues of Spanish nationalism interpret the leftist policy in favor of decentralization as well as its rhetorical defense of the right of self-determination for peripheral nationalities as originating in this alienation (Seixas 2001, Uriarte 2002). Spanish nationalism, the conventional story says, was heavily identified with the Francoist regime, so the opposition, in order to differentiate itself from the dictatorship, would have chosen to hide its national affiliation and support the cause of alternative nationalisms. However, as the constitutional regime has consolidated, the symbolic disputes have heavily diluted and both the mainstream left and right have successively taken on political power in Spain. Considering this process, and the emergence of a sort of new 'national consensus' represented by the 1978 constitution, we might expect the different intensities of Spanish nationalism across the ideological spectrum to attenuate. The Spanish nation should no longer be a rightist idea and, despite enduring differences in its definition, the mainstream Spanish political and social spectrum has come up with a relatively shared understanding of Spain as a democratic nation able to accommodate all its citizens regardless of their ideological preferences. Outside of this consensus we shall only find some minor extremist political groups as well as alternative nationalists.

This is the conventional story. However, it refers to the political and intellectual elites and no research has been done to assess it at the mass level. Was the Spanish population so ideologically divided in terms of its sense of Spanishness at the end of the Francoist regime? Has this new national consensus really emerged and crossed over the ideological boundaries? Do most Spanish citizens share a sense of nationhood regardless of their ideological preferences, or on the contrary, differences in intensity and contents of Spanish national identity persist between leftists and rightists in Spain?

In this paper I address these questions. Indeed, the task I pursue here is the empirical assessment of the individual-level implications of the conventional story sketched above. To be sure, if this story is to have any implication at all at the individual level –and I believe it has- we should find strong differences in the intensity of Spanish national identity among leftist and rightist citizens at the beginning of the democratic period and a progressive dilution of these differences as the democracy consolidated. In a previous article (Muñoz, 2009) I empirically demonstrated this process for the period 1981-2000 using national pride as a dependent variable. There I showed how, despite a clear and general tendency towards the reduction of ideological polarization, it proves quite sensitive to short-term political cycles. Specifically, the arrival of the rightist Popular Party in 1996 to power seemed to foster a renewed ideological polarization in Spanish national pride.

This paper complements the longitudinal analysis carried out in the aforementioned article with a more elaborated cross-sectional analysis of 2007. The paper is organized as follows: first, I replicate the analysis carried out in the previous article with new data for 2007. This allows me to test whether the observed ideological polarization of Spanish national pride in 2000 still holds in

2007 or, on the contrary, it has disappeared again. Then, I discuss the limits of the previous analyses that in my view are related to the use of national pride as a dependent variable. To address the potential problems posed by this dependent variable, I extend the analysis to use a new set of dependent variables, that have been constructed to capture, not only the intensity of the citizen's attachment to Spain but especially the contents of their national identity –in other words, the main conceptions of Spanishness. Therefore, the third section presents the new dependent variables and briefly discusses how they were constructed, and the fourth presents the new analyses of ideological polarization of the varieties of Spanish national identity.

2. Ideological polarization of Spanish national pride, 2007

As discussed in the introduction, the long-lasting Francoist dictatorship and its monopolization of Spanish patriotism leads me to hypothesize that at the end of the authoritarian period, we should find a strong relationship between ideology (as well as Catholicism, region and generation) and Spanish national pride. Some of these relationships have substantially diluted alongside the process of democratization and democratic consolidation, while others persist. In the case of ideology, that is our focus of interest in this paper, I have previously shown that it has a volatile relationship with Spanish national pride: during the 1981-1995 period the 'ideological bias' of Spanish national pride disappeared, but from 1995 to 2000, coinciding with the arrival of the PP to the Spanish government, it reappeared.

What should we expect, thus, to be the situation in 2007? If we take the previous evidence as expressing a mechanic relationship between political cycles and ideological polarization, we should expect ideology to not have any effect on Spanish national pride, because in 2004 the Socialist Party took on power again.

However, a more nuanced understanding of the 1981-2000 evolution, must lead us to conclude that the reasonable expectation for 2007 is that there will not be a significant change with respect to 2000 or, in case we observe an evolution at all, that it will be towards an increased polarization. Certainly, we could think that the return of the Socialist party to the Spanish government could have softened the ideological polarization of Spanishness that the PP period had exacerbated, as it happened during the socialist governments of the 1980's and early 90's. However, the harsh conflict between the PSOE and the Popular Party during the 2004-08 term about the reform of the Autonomy Statute of Catalonia and other issues related to the national identity might have counterbalanced the 'government effect' by strengthening the association between right-wing ideology and Spanish nationalism.

To test this hypothesis, in the first place I briefly review the bivariate association between ideology and national pride. Then I develop the multivariate analysis to jointly test the effects of a set of variables and uncover potentially spurious relationships. To conduct these analyses, I will work with the survey CIS 2667².

The relationship between ideology and national pride is, as we have seen, somewhat volatile. It was strong in 1981, it had disappeared in 1995 and it was again strong in 2000. I have already discussed why should we expect the relationship between ideology and national pride to remain strong in 2006/07, despite the return of the Socialist Party to the government in 2004. Table 1 shows the distribution of national pride levels across five ideological groups, as well as the average values for each group:

² The questionnaire of the survey was designed by a research team composed by Eduard Bonet, Santiago Pérez-Nievas, Iván Llamazares and myself. Therefore, the formulation of the questions that I will be using in this paper is a joint work of the whole team. Mónica Méndez and Joan Font, from the CIS research board, also made valuable contributions to the questionnaire.

Table 1: *National Pride and Ideology. Column % and Average*

	Left	Center- left	Center	Center- right	Right	Total
	<i>(0-2)</i>	<i>(3-4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>	<i>(6-7)</i>	<i>(8-10)</i>	
Not at all	11,51	4,78	1,94	0,71	0,74	4,06
Not very	17,13	13,01	6,38	2,27	1,77	9,08
Fairly	40,69	48,79	45,97	43,34	25,83	43,82
Very	30,68	33,42	45,71	53,69	71,66	43,04
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100
<i>Average</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3.5</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>
	<i>.90</i>	<i>.12</i>	<i>.35</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>.68</i>	<i>.25</i>

In this table it can clearly be seen how there is a strong bivariate association between the two variables: as we move towards the right of the ideological spectrum, the average values of national pride substantially increase. Indeed, among the leftists, only a 30,68% expresses to be very proud of being Spanish, while among those placed at the center of the ideological scale the 'very proud' group is a 45,7% and among the rightists a 71,6%. On the contrary, the percentage of those that are not proud at all falls from an 11% in the left to a scarce 4,06% in the right. Summarizing, we have a clear indication that the ideological polarization of Spanish national pride remained in place in 2007.

However, this relationship might be completely or partially spurious. Other variables related both with ideology and national pride –such as generation, for example- might be *causing* it. To test for those potential confounding effects, I develop a multivariate analysis, to jointly assess the effect a set of potentially relevant variables on Spanish national pride.

The variables included in the model are: 'Catholic', which is a dummy variable with value 1 if the respondent identifies herself as a Catholic and 0 otherwise, 'Ideology', (a 0-10 left-right self-placement scale) and Cohort –several dummies for the cohorts based on the Gunther, Torcal and Montero (1998) scheme³. I also include dummies for the territories with distinct language, plus the Canary Islands. The model is, given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, an ordered logit regression, with robust standard errors.⁴

Table 2: Ordinal logit regression models. Dependent Variable: National Pride. Coefficients (and S.E)

	Coef.	Std.Err. (robust)	P>z
Catholic	0.75	0.12	0.000
Ideology	0.23	0.03	0.000
Cohort 2, Regime consolidation (born 1938-52)*	0.12	0.18	0.500
Cohort 3, Regime crisis, economic dev. (1953-62)	-0.20	0.19	0.279
Cohort 4, Transition (1963-67)	-0.32	0.20	0.105
Cohort 5, Democracy (Born after 1968)	-0.57	0.16	0.000
Catalonia**	-1.27	0.14	0.000
Basque Country	-2.42	0.13	0.000
Valencia	-0.18	0.11	0.122
Balearic Islands	-0.62	0.51	0.222
Navarre	-1.47	0.43	0.001
Galicia	-0.99	0.18	0.000
Canary Islands	-0.50	0.33	0.128
/cut1	-2.88	0.24	
/cut2	-1.37	0.23	
/cut3	1.29	0.23	
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	<i>0.1138</i>		
<i>MacKelvey and Zavonia R²</i>	<i>0.251</i>		
<i>Wald chi2(3)</i>	<i>611.83</i>		

³ The scheme is based on important events or periods of Spain's political history, and takes young adulthood as the reference points to define generations, following the well-known 'impressionable years' hypothesis. Here I have collapsed cohorts 1 (pre-war and war) and 2 (Autarchy) given the reduced number of individuals in the first cohort, so the scheme is a 5-cohort one rather than the 6-cohort classification defined by Gunther, Torcal and Montero.

⁴ This model does violate the parallel regressions assumption. The effects of several independent variables are stronger for the extreme categories. A generalized ordered logit, however, does not suggest any major change in the overall results.

*Cohort 1 (pre-war, war and autarchy) is the reference category

**The rest of Spain is the reference

The model confirms the results that emerged from the bivariate analysis. Ideology has a strong, significant effect over national pride. Those individuals located at the right of the ideological scale are more prone to express high levels of Spanish national pride.

Comparing these results with the previous evidence (Muñoz, 2009a), we can state that both the religious and the ideological polarization in Spanish national pride are stronger in 2007 than they were in 2000. Indeed, if we calculate the predicted probabilities of being 'very proud' in Spain for Catholics and non-Catholics, the difference is 0,15 (while in 2000 it was 0,11). As for ideology, the distance in the predicted probability of being very proud between extreme left and extreme right is 0,47, while in 2000 it was 0,3. We have to interpret this direct comparison very cautiously, because the surveys do not have the same sample design nor fieldwork institution, and some of the scales (such as ideology) are different in the CIS2667 than in the World Values Survey. However, even if cautiously, we have seen that the general tendency towards the erasing of differences might have been reverted in this period. This is not a very surprising result, given that during these years there have been in Spain sharp conflicts between the state-wide right and left with respect to the national question, mainly related to the reform of the Catalan Autonomy Statute, carried out between 2004 and 2006. The Catholic Church has also taken part in these debates, so it might have contributed to this increased polarization.

Regarding the other variables introduced in the model, we can state that cohort differences are not as clear as expected. I have left the group one (that merges cohorts 1 and 2 in the Torcal-Montero scheme) as the reference category. In the previous analysis we had seen significant difference at least between the three younger cohorts and the three older ones. The reduction of the differences might be indicating a certain life-cycle effect. As cohorts age, they tend to converge with the older ones. That would explain why only the youngest cohort, that is not bounded and, thus, continuously receives new incorporations, is the only one to remain significantly distinct to the rest. The youngest group shows lower levels of national pride. As for the territorial differences, we see how the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Navarre and Catalonia, have significantly lower levels of national pride than the monolingual autonomous communities. Galicia has a negative and significant (but small) coefficient too, while the other communities are not significantly distinct from the rest of Spain.

This model has shown that Spanish national pride suffers from a strong ideological (as well as religious and territorial) polarization in 2007. However, as I said at the beginning of the paper, in order to correctly interpret the implications of these results it is important to sharpen the definition of the dependent variable. In the next section I explore more systematically the relationship between national pride and a typology of national identities, and then refine and repeat the analysis with new dependent variables.

3. National pride, constitutional and traditional identities

If we look at the previous analysis, we can easily conclude that there are strong differences between left and right with respect to identification with Spain.

Spanish identity, if we are to limit ourselves to the previous analysis, is still mainly a matter of the right. However, such a conclusion might be misleading. Why this is so? We could easily think of an alternative hypothesis: it is not that the leftist citizens feel less identified with Spain than the rightists: they hold a different way of conceiving their Spanishness. Indeed, if there are qualitatively different ways of feeling Spaniard, and national pride is more closely related to one of them, the results of the previous analysis might be biased.

To control for this potential source of bias, we need in the first place a measure of the relevant varieties of Spanish national identity. With such a measure we will be able to refine the previous analysis and explore in more detail the ideological polarization of Spanishness. The identification of the relevant types of Spanish national identity, as well as the elaboration of a measurement instrument is a complex task that falls beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, I will just limit myself to the use of the work done previously, in my dissertation (Muñoz, 2009b) and the research conducted by the research group that designed the CIS2667 questionnaire.

Briefly, the research team carried out a Q-methodological analysis (Brown 1980) comprising 58 interviews in 4 Autonomous Communities. Through this study, we identified two relevant ideal-types of Spanish national identity, that we called 'traditional' and 'constitutional' –plus a third group that we called 'non-Spanish'. Using the insights from the Q study, we designed a set of 12 survey items that were applied in the CIS2667 questionnaire, aimed at capturing these types of Spanish identity. Through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, using 8 of these items, I constructed two scales of constitutional and traditional identity. The following table displays the items included in each of the scales.

Table 3: *Constitutional and Traditional Spanish identities. Items in the scales*

Constitutional identity

	Original wording	English translation
<i>language</i>	El idioma español es un elemento básico de nuestra identidad	<i>The Spanish language is a basic component of our identity</i>
<i>united</i>	España debe mantenerse unida para garantizar la igualdad entre todos los ciudadanos y la solidaridad entre las distintas CA.	<i>Spain has to remain united in order to guarantee the equality among all citizens and the solidarity among autonomous communities</i>
<i>Constitution</i>	Valoro positivamente la Constitución, porque ha sido un instrumento muy útil para mantener unido el país	<i>I value in a positive way the Constitution because it has been a very important tool for keeping the country united</i>
<i>History 2</i>	La historia que compartimos, con sus cosas buenas y malas, es la que nos hace a todos españoles	<i>The history we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes us all spaniards</i>
Traditional identity		
<i>History 1</i>	Los países tienen un carácter propio que se manifiesta en episodios de su historia: para España podrían ser el Cid, los Reyes Católicos, el descubrimiento de América, entre otros	<i>Countries do have their own character that is made evident in episodes of their history. For Spain they could be the Cid, the Catholic Kings, the discovery of America, among others</i>
<i>Anthem</i>	Cuando escucho el himno nacional de España, siento que formo parte de una comunidad de la que me enorgullezco	<i>When I hear to the Spanish national anthem, I feel that I am part of a community which I am proud of</i>
<i>Flag</i>	La bandera de España no despierta ninguna emoción en mí	<i>The Spain's flag does not create any emotion in me</i>
<i>Catholicism</i>	El catolicismo es muy importante como parte de la identidad española	<i>Catholicism is very important as a part of the Spanish identity</i>

As the table shows, the constitutional identity, as I measure it, comprises the positive evaluation of the 1978 Constitution as granting Spain's unity, a 'universalistic' type of justification for this unity and also the consideration of the Spanish language and history as founding elements of Spanish identity. On the other hand, traditional identity includes a more essentialist and traditional understanding of Spain's history, the emotional attachment with the main national symbols as well as the consideration of Catholicism as an important element of Spanish identity.

However, it would be misleading to think of these two types as mutually excluding ways of conceiving Spanishness, or as the opposing extremes of a single continuum. To have an idea of how they relate to each other and how they are distributed in the Spanish society, in the following table I present the basic, descriptive statistics of the summative scales constructed with the aforementioned items:

Table 4: *Constitutional and Traditional identity scales. Descriptive statistics*

Variable	bs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Scale constitutional	2738	16.62	2.68	4	20
Scale traditional	2665	13.88	3.39	4	20

As we can see, both scales range from 4 to 20. In this table we can already note some interesting things. The first one is that, not surprisingly, the mean is substantially higher for the constitutional scale than for the traditional one. Moreover, the standard deviation is also higher in the latter than in the former. If we link this evidence with the fact that both scales are positively correlated (.66) that gives us a first sense of the actual relationship among them. It seems that the constitutional Spanish identity is very widely shared by the Spaniards, and that those that embrace the traditional identity are a subset of the first group. To put it in other words: the constitutional identity is not necessarily contradictory with the traditional one, but rather complementary. Many people embrace both, while others only hold the first one. The group of those that express a strong traditional identity but reject the constitutional one is, apparently, very small (indeed, only a 7% of the sample has a higher value on the traditional scale than in the constitutional one).

Table 5 will help clarify this relationship. I have converted both scales into dichotomous variables, in which all the individuals with a value lower than 16 are categorized as 'low' and those with values higher than 16 are counted as 'high'⁵

Table 5: *Traditional and Constitutional identity. Dichotomous variables*

	Low traditional	High traditional	Total
Low constitutional	19.95	1.48	21.43
High constitutional	43.85	34.73	78.58
Total	63.8	36.21	100

Here we can clearly see how these two variables relate to each other: the percentage of those that have a high traditional identity and a low constitutional one is very small (1,48%), while the reverse is not true: 43,8% of the whole sample has a low traditional identity and a high constitutional one. This confirms the idea of a cumulative relationship between the two types of national identity. And shows how the constitutional identity is a consensual one (78,58) while the traditional one appears to be more divisive (21,43%). That must lead us to disregard the conception of this conceptual pair as competing extremes of an underlying continuum.

Having presented the basic typology and measurement instrument of the varieties of Spanish national identity, we can go back to the problem we posed above: the refinement of the analysis that we carried out using national pride as a dependent variable. This is important because, given the contents of the two scales, one could easily think that national pride, since it is affective in nature, could be much more closely related to traditional Spanish identity than to the constitutional one, that appears to have much less affective components than the former –such as identification with the national symbols.

⁵ 16 would be the value of someone 'agreeing' in the four items of the scale

The first step, therefore, is to test whether this is actually the case: Is national pride closely associated to the traditional Spanish identity, or it is equally related to constitutional identity? In other words: is the measure of identification with Spain we have been using so far biased towards one of the two relevant conceptions of Spanishness we identified? The following cross-table presents the bivariate association of national pride with the typology created using the aforementioned scales.

Table 6: *National pride and national identity typology. Cross-tabulation*

National Pride	Low traditional and low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
All				
Not at all	16.14	0.98	0.09	3.47
Not very	27.17	5.93	0.35	7.99
Fairly proud	42.56	50.87	30.18	42
Very proud	14.12	42.22	69.38	46.54
Total	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>

In this table we already have a clear indication that our concerns were reasonable and, indeed, national pride is more closely related to traditional identity than to the purely constitutional one. While 70% of the individuals in the high constitutional/high traditional category did declare to be very proud of being Spaniards, this was only the case for 42% of the high constitutional/low traditional individuals. But we can explore this relationship in a more systematic way, by regressing national pride against the categories of the typology. Table 7 displays the results of an ordered logistic regression:

Table 7: *Ordinal logit regression model. National Pride and identity typology.*

Ordinal logit, National Pride						
		Model 1		Model 2		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	CC coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
constitutional, high traditional	(refer)			3.24	0.17	0.000

Constitutional, low	-1.14	0.11	0.000	2.10	0.16	0.000
Traditional, low	-1.40	0.42	0.001	1.84	0.43	0.000
Constitutional, low	-3.24	0.17	0.000	(refer)		
_cut1	-5.12	0.15		-1.87	0.13	
_cut2	-3.63	0.12		-0.39	0.11	
_cut3	-0.85	0.09		2.39	0.15	
Pseudo R ²	0.131			0.131		
MK/Z R ²	0.289			0.289		
		365.97*		365.97***		
Wald chi2(3)	**					
N	2354			2354		

In the first model, we can see how, indeed, there is a statistically significant difference in national pride between the high constitutional/high traditional identity groups. Thus, it confirms a closer association of national pride with traditional identity. However, that does not mean that there is no association between national pride and constitutional identity. Indeed, in model 2, where I leave as a reference the low/low category, we can see how the difference between this group and the one with only high constitutional identity is also significant, and strong. Moreover, this is not a result driven exclusively by the effect of Catalan and Basque citizens within the model. On the contrary, if we repeat the analysis excluding these territories, the results prove stable.

In any case, these results suggest that we must be cautious in the interpretation of the results obtained previously as applying to the Spanish national identity as a whole: they might be driven by the closer association of national pride with traditional identity. In other words: it might well be that the constitutional Spanish identity is ideologically neutral, and the observed biases in national pride are based on its closer association to the traditional understanding of the Spanish identity. However, we have seen that national pride also appears to be somehow related to the constitutional identity, as shown by the significant coefficient of the “high constitutional, low traditional” dummy in model 2. Thus, the results

obtained above should not just be dismissed as representing only the traditional Spanish national identity. Therefore, the challenge remains to empirically assess the validity of these results for all the types of national identity I have defined or, on the contrary, reduce the scope of the findings.

4. Ideological polarization and the varieties of Spanish national identity

How should we expect ideology to relate to the typology? The reasonable expectation is that the traditional version of Spanish national identity, by its definition and advocates, will be closely associated with right-wing ideology. The relationship of ideology with the constitutional identity is more complex to predict. In the way I have defined it, constitutional Spanish identity comprises a Unitarian idea of Spain based on 'universalist' principles and the embracing of the 1978 constitution as a fundamental mean to preserve Spain's unity. However, it also comprises cultural elements, such as the Spanish language –that is a central identity marker- or an unitarianist, albeit critical reading of the Spanish history. My understanding of it is that this idea of Spain reflects the '*constitutional nationalism*' (Bastida 1998) that arose from the 'transitional consensus'. If this is true, we should expect the constitutional identity to not be biased in ideological or religious terms, but rather be an all-embracing conception of Spanishness except, perhaps, for some small sectors of the Spanish far-left (and perhaps, of the far-right) that openly question the transition process and its outcomes and, more importantly, for alternative (mainly Catalan and Basque) nationalists.

It is worth, then, exploring the association of ideology with the Spanish national identity typology I have defined. I will start by analyzing the bivariate cross-tabulations, and then move to a multivariate analysis in order to jointly assess the effect of ideology, religion, region and generation on the varieties of the Spanish national identity. Table 8 gives some indications about the relationship between ideology and the identity typology. The link between traditional identity and the right side of the ideological spectrum seems clear, while the constitutional one is

less biased, except for the far-left category, in which the percentage of low/low is almost 40%.

Table 8: *National identity typology and ideology*

Typology	Left	Center-left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Total
Low traditional, low constitutional	39.29	24.07	16.79	12.20	4.38	21.15
High constitutional, low traditional	46.34	50.24	49.44	37.51	16.07	44.51
High constitutional, high traditional	14.13	24.46	32.09	49.10	75.68	32.94
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Percent</i>	<i>17.47</i>	<i>29.48</i>	<i>29.73</i>	<i>15.12</i>	<i>8.20</i>	<i>100</i>

Perhaps this relationship can be better perceived through a graph in which we plot the fitted values of the two scales of traditional and constitutional identity against the values of the ideological scale. Both types of identity, as we have seen, are positively correlated with the left-right scale, but we should expect the traditional identity to be more closely related to ideology than the constitutional one.

Figure 1: *Constitutional and Traditional identity, expected values by ideology*




Figure 1 shows that the expected relationships do indeed hold. The slope of the fitted line relating the traditional Spanish identity to ideology is clearly higher. However, the slope of constitutional identity is clearly positive, so apparently there is an empirical relation between both kinds of Spanish identity and left-right self-placement. We could think of the relationship between the constitutional identity and ideology as being non-linear and driven mainly by the effect of the far-left. However, through a visual non-parametric analysis via lowess smoother (not shown) we can determine that indeed the relationship is quite linear.

This result suggests that the ideological polarization of Spanish national pride is affecting both types of identity. However, this might be driven by the influence of other variables or, simply by the positive correlation between traditional and constitutional identities. In the multivariate analysis I will separate the effects of ideology on both scales.

Multivariate analysis

Until now, I have been mainly working with the typology defined through the dichotomization and cross tabulation of the two scales of Spanish identity. This strategy has been useful to illustrate the patterns and explore the kinds of relationships between ideology and the types of identity. However, in the multivariate regression I use the scales by themselves as dependent variables, as to not to lose nuance and the variation within the two groups I have defined for each scale. I conduct a separate analysis for each type of identity, with the same independent variables, in order to see if the explanatory variables are the same or not. As I have discussed, we should expect ideology to exert a strong influence on the traditional Spanish identity. As for the constitutional one, its more consensual nature might lead us to hypothesize that the effect of these variables will not be as strong. However, the positive correlation between the two might influence the results. I deal with this issue below.

In table 9 we can see the model referring to the traditional identity. As expected, all variables are statistically significant, and relate to the dependent variable in the expected direction. Traditional Spanish national identity is, thus, strongly related to right-wing ideology, as well as Catholic religion, generation and territory of residence. Overall, these variables account for 42% of the total variance of the dependent variable, which indicates a very good fit considering that the model only includes the theoretically relevant variables with no additional controls.

Table 9: OLS regression, Traditional Spanish identity

	Beta Coef.	Std. Err. (robust)	P>z
Ideology	0.29	0.04	0.00
Catholic	0.28	0.17	0.00
Cohort 2 (born 1938-52)	-0.05	0.23	0.05
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0.10	0.25	0.00

	Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0.14	0.27	0.00
1968)	Cohort 5 (Born after	-0.26	0.21	0.00
	Balearic Islands	-0.04	0.49	0.04
	Canary Islands	-0.05	0.46	0.07
	Catalonia	-0.24	0.18	0.00
	Valencia	-0.05	0.15	0.00
	Galicia	-0.11	0.30	0.00
	Navarre	-0.07	0.35	0.00
	Basque Country	-0.21	0.19	0.00
	R^2	0,42		
	N	97	21	

Both ideology and religion seem to have a similarly strong relationship with traditional Spanish identity. As for the generations, we observe a linear relationship: each generation has lower levels of traditional Spanish identity than the previous one. This shows how those citizens socialized under the democracy, independently of their religious or ideological affiliation, tend to share less this traditional understanding of the Spanish national identity.

Overall, these results show how the traditionalist version of the Spanish national identity is a highly divisive understanding of Spain, linked to a specific ideology. The generational effect is also strong and significant, which shows how this is a version of the Spanish national identity that is progressively being eroded through generational replacement.

Does the constitutional identity follow the same pattern? So far, I have interpreted this view of Spain as the expression of the transitional consensus that

I call *Constitutional Spanish nationalism*. If this is true, we should not observe the same kind of ideological polarization that stand out for the traditional identity.

In table 10 I present two regression models with the Constitutional identity as the dependent variable. Both models have the same set of independent variables that I have been discussing until now. The difference between them is that the second one includes, as an additional variable, the control by traditional identity. This is meant to 'clean' the model out of the confounding effects that the traditional identity might have over the results. We have seen that both types of identity are positively correlated, so holding constant the traditional identity will allow the *unique* effects of the independent variables over constitutional identity to emerge. In other words: by introducing traditional identity as a predictor in the model, the results that come out are those that relate each of the independent variables to constitutional identity assuming a given level of traditional identity. The question we will be able to answer, then, is: if we hold the degree of agreement with the traditional identity scale constant, how do these variables affect the constitutional scale?

Table 10: OLS regression, Constitutional Spanish identity

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Coef.	Robust SE	P>z	Coef.	Robust SE	P>z
<hr/>			<hr/>		

<i>Traditional identity</i>				0.52	0.02	0.000
Ideology	0.16	0.03	0.000	0.01	0.03	0.545
Catholic	0.14	0.14	0.000	-0.01	0.14	0.776
Cohort 2 (1938-52)	0.03	0.18	0.331	0.04	0.19	0.086
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0.04	0.20	0.127	0.01	0.20	0.604
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0.03	0.21	0.202	0.03	0.20	0.258
Cohort 5 (Born after 1968)	-0.09	0.18	0.004	0.03	0.18	0.349
Balearic Islands	-0.08	0.44	0.000	-0.06	0.42	0.006
Canary Islands	-0.06	0.27	0.003	-0.04	0.29	0.063
Catalonia	-0.34	0.18	0.000	-0.22	0.17	0.000
Valencia	-0.10	0.13	0.000	-0.07	0.13	0.000
Galicia	-0.11	0.18	0.000	-0.05	0.19	0.002
Navarre	-0.05	0.42	0.018	-0.02	0.35	0.300
Basque Country	-0.31	0.22	0.000	-0.21	0.20	0.000
R^2	<i>0,30</i>			<i>0,46</i>		
N	2258			2056		

The results shown by the first model are similar to those of the traditional identity, although with some relevant differences. The first one is a significantly lower R^2 (0,30 vs. 0,42) that points to a poorer fit of the model. Overall, the included variables are less able to account for the variation of the dependent variable in this case than in the traditional identity. That is, in itself, a relevant finding: constitutional Spanish identity is indeed less determined by ideology, religion and territory than the traditional one. However, these variables still explain around one third of the overall variance, which is not negligible.

We see how ideology is still a significant predictor of constitutional national identity, in the same direction as in the case of the traditional one, although the coefficient is smaller clearly smaller: 0,16 vs. 0,29 for traditional identity. Therefore, the degree of ideological polarization of constitutional Spanish identity,

even if it persists, is clearly smaller than it was for traditional identity. Religious and generational differences are, in this case, less clear than in the traditional identity. Only the democracy cohort has significantly lower levels of constitutional identity than the war and postwar ones. Among the other cohorts there are no significant differences.

On the contrary, territorial effects are consistent and follow the same pattern as before: while they are very important in the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country, they are not as relevant in the rest of the linguistically distinct territories. Living in Catalonia or the Basque Country, indeed, emerge as the most powerful predictors of constitutional Spanish identity, even more than in the case of traditional identity, and twice as powerful as ideology or religion.

However, these results might be driven by the hidden effect of traditional identity that correlates positively with the constitutional one. This is why in model 2 I include traditional identity as a control, in order to hold it constant and estimate the effect of the relevant variables on the constitutional identity without its influence. As table 10 shows, the inclusion of this variable changes the results we obtain in several ways. The first one is a sharp increase in the R^2 , that rises from 0,3 up to 0,46. Second, we see how the effect of ideology (and the rest of the main explanatory variables) disappears after controlling for traditional identity. The dramatic increase in the R^2 , though, points that traditional identity not only captures the effect of these variables, but incorporates additional explanatory power to the model as well.

Therefore, we can conclude that the ideological polarization of constitutional Spanish identity we found is explained by the common ground shared by both types of identities. Once we focus the variance of constitutional identity net of the

confounding effects of the traditional variety, we see that ideology has no statistically significant effect at all.

Interestingly, the only variables that keep their effects after controlling for traditional identity are the territorial dummies, except for the case of Navarre. The depressing effect of living in linguistically distinct communities (mainly Catalonia and the Basque Country) that we observed in the previous model was not mainly due to a lower penetration of the traditional Spanish nationalism in these territories. Indeed, the coefficients here are even higher than in the model for traditional identity. This is a clear indicator that the main integration problem for the contemporary Spanish nationalism in either of its versions, relies in these two territories.

5. Discussion and conclusions

In this paper we have explored the relationship between ideology (in terms of left-right) and Spanish national identity at the individual level. Our aim was to assess whether in 2007 the ideological polarization of Spanish identity that resulted from the francoist monopolization of patriotism still persisted or, on the contrary, the consolidation of the democratic regime has erased the differences between left and right in the degree of identification with Spain.

The first step of the analysis has consisted in the estimation of the effect of ideology over Spanish national pride. We have seen how it has a strong impact and the levels of national pride among the citizens placed at the right of the ideological spectrum remain significantly higher than those of the citizens placed at the left. However, I discussed the possibility that these results were biased by a misleading dependent variable. If the differences between left and right are of type of identity rather than intensity, and national pride is more closely associated

with one of the types of identity, we could extract the wrong conclusions. To control for that possibility, I have expanded the analysis by substituting the dependent variable (national pride) by two scales that were designed to capture the relevant varieties of Spanishness: constitutional and traditional identities.

After assessing that, in effect, national pride is more closely associated with traditional Spanish identity than with its constitutional variety, I replicated the previous analysis with the new dependent variables. The results for traditional identity are very clear-cut: it is mainly a rightist conception of Spain and huge differences between left and right persist. When analyzing constitutional identity, the picture that emerges is more complex. On one hand, we have seen how, indeed, it also suffers from ideological polarization: the more rightist a citizen declares to be, the stronger constitutional identity she will hold. However, the effect of ideology over constitutional identity disappears if we estimate it net of the effect of traditional identity. In other words: the only understanding of Spain that reveals as ideologically neutral is the constitutional identity when it does not go together with elements of the traditional variety.

These results reveal, at the citizens' level, a problem of integration for the Spanish national identity that is still ideologically biased. It is important to note that this is especially the case for the traditional understanding of Spanishness, that together with the consideration of Catholicism and an essentialist reading of history as important parts of Spanishness, comprises the affective attachment to Spain's official symbols –the flag and the anthem.

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