

























#### Cracks:

- 1. The word 'pricing' is absent from the Bonn Conference (2001) 27 recommendations for action
- 2. The 2002 Stockholm statement that under the title 'Urgent action needed for water security' does not refer to the use of economic instruments in managing water.
- 3. The World Water Assessment Program (UNESCO-WWAP, 2006) stressed the importance of non-economic goals in irrigation, the potential limitations to volumetric pricing, and the goal of recovering O&M costs only.
- 4. New stock-taking litterature (Bosworth *et al.* (2002), Cornish and Perry (2003), Hellegers and Perry (2004), Molle and Berkoff (2007)
- 5. World Bank internal revisionists: 'Pricing promotes efficiency and conservation... but there are few successful examples because of the economic and cultural difficulties of putting a value on a natural resource' (Pitman, 2002).
- 6. In 2003, the Bank acknowledges the 'yawning gap between simple economic principles... and on-the-ground reality.' (World Bank, 2003)

It has often been stated that having users pay 'the full cost of water' would solve these problems. Experience has shown that the situation is considerably more complex and nuanced, and that it is not enough to just extol the virtues of pricing. This section outlines a different approach – one of 'principled pragmatism.' 'Principled' because economic principles such as ensuring that users take financial and resource costs into account when using water, are very important. And 'pragmatism' because solutions need to be tailored to specific, widely varying natural, cultural, economic and political circumstances (World Bank, 2003).

Yet the soundness of the theoretical background is constantly reaffirmed (World Bank, 2003). Difficulties in implementing water pricing, however, are often ascribed to technical or cultural difficulties, and to political resistance of entrenched sectoral

Crucial differences are overlooked and even made use of to blur the picture between domestic and irrigation water, between classical large-scale surface irrigation and pump irrigation, between government and farmer-managed schemes, between low- and high-tech distribution systems, staple and cash-crop production, and between developed and developing countries

Studies often superficial, with simplistic causalities, or derived from modelling

Possible objectives and benefits pooled together

# 2

Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM), Water User Associations (WUAs), or Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT)

### *Convergence of* :

- work on Farmer-managed irrigation systems and the observation of sophisticated self-governing communal systems
- 2. Participatory/decentralization rhetoric associated with neoliberal rolling-the-state ideology
- 3. States' fiscal stress and donors' fatigue with endless scheme rehabilitation







International Workshop on Participatory Irrigation Management: Benefits and Second Generation Problems, sponsored in 1997 by the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank (EDI) and the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI).

- In general, IMT has reduced the cost of government allocations towards the O&M of irrigation systems. However, some irrigation systems were unsustainable...
- The performance of water services in terms of fee collection has been erratic.
- Irrigation management transfer does not necessarily lead to increases in cropping intensities or yields. There are only a few documented cases where....
- The closer involvement of WUAs has resulted in increased accountability, transparency and responsibility, as has been reported from Mexico and China, for example.
- Some governments had high expectations that the private sector would become involved ... It seems now that these projections were either too optimistic or poorly conceived,
- With few exceptions, the process of capacity building of the staff of WUAs and leading farmers has been unsatisfactory

In summary, expected objectives have been met but not to the degree initially expected... In general, there has been a tendency to overstate the objectives and expectations of IMT programmes, creating expectations that have not always been fulfilled (FAO, 2007).



# **Knowledge production (1)**

- The literature often relates experience at the **national level**, and offers a very 'averaged' and evened-out view.
- Most of the literature originates from persons belonging to ministries, companies, research institutions or aid agencies that are linked to these projects and merely publicize their results in a summary and uncritical manner.
- Most of the assessments are done while the project/policy is still running, or a very short time afterwards, and are influenced by the injection of staff and cash that comes with the project.
- There is a sheer lack of independent, comprehensive, long-term assessments, which makes it very difficult to discuss the success or sustainability of any reform.
- the complexity of identifying causal links: whether yields have increased (or not) after PIM/IMT might be related to a set of variables and causes (prices, rainfall, pests, labor shortage, etc) that are not easy to unpack and have little to do with the reform.

## **Knowledge production (2)**

- PIM/IMT is by nature a social process and the quality of this process changes in behaviors, social interactions, sense of responsibility, accountability mechanisms, etc. - is very hard to capture on a quantitative scale.
- Equity and reliability of water supply over large areas is also often hard to measure; official data are poor or dubious
- Debate dominated by the drummers; celebrated in conferences and jamborees; self-referencing
- The fad becomes a craze: Donors like IFAD or USAID, money-lenders such as the World Bank or ADB include setting WUAs in loan conditionalities or make them the main target of projects
- **Opportunistic alignments** of (some) farmers ('pilot areas') and line agencies concerned (Big Bang in Andhra Pradesh)
- INPIM network dies out Literature and interest drop











