Aumann, R., Maschler, M., 1985. Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy
problem from the Talmud. Journal of Economic Theory 36, 195-213.
van den Brink, R., Funaki Y., van der Laan, G., 2013. Characterization
of the reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by exemption and exclusion
properties. European Journal of Operational Research 228, 413-417.
van den Brink, R., Moreno-Ternero, J.D., 2017. The reverse TAL-family of
rules for bankruptcy problems. Annals of Operations Research 254,
449-465.

Chang, C., Hu, C.-C., 2017. A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel.
International Journal of Game Theory 46, 185-204.

Chun, Y., 1999. Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems. Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory 28, 511-520.

Chun, Y., Schummer, J., Thomson, W., 2001. Constrained egalitarianism:
a new solution for claims problems. Seoul Journal of Economics 14,
269-297.

Dagan, N., 1996. New characterization of old bankruptcy rules. Social
Choice and Welfare 13, 51-59.

Dagan, N., Serrano, R., Volij, O., 1997. A noncooperative view of consistent
bankruptcy rules. Games and Economic Behavior 18, 55-72.

Dominguez, D., Thomson, W., 2006. A new solution to the problem of
adjudicating conflicting claims. Economic Theory 28, 283-307.

Hu, C.-C., Tsay, M.-H., Yeh, C.-H., 2012. Axiomatic and strategic justi-
fications for the constrained equal benefits rule in airport problems.
Games and Economic Behavior 75, 185-197.

Hu, C.-C., Tsay, M.-H., Yeh, C.-H., 2018. A study of the nucleolus in
the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives.
Games and Economic Behavior 109, 82-98.

Krishna, V., Serrano, R., 1996. Multilateral bargaining. Review of Economic
Studies 63, 61-80.

Maschler, M., Solan, E., Zamir, S., 2013. Game Theory. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. Cambridge, MA.

Moreno-Ternero, J.D., 2011a. Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 29-36.

Moreno-Ternero, J.D., 2011b. A coalitional procedure leading to a family of
bankruptcy rules. Operations Research Letters 39, 1-3.
19
http://www.upo.es/econ

Moreno-Ternero, J.D., Tsay, M.-H., Yeh, C.-H., 2020. A strategic justifica-
tion of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds. International
Journal of Game Theory 49, 1045-1057.

Moreno-Ternero J., Villar A., 2004. The Talmud rule and the securement of
agents’ awards. Mathematical Social Sciences 47, 245-257.

Moreno-Ternero, J.D., Villar, A., 2006. The TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy
problems. Social Choice and Welfare 27, 231-249.

Nash, J.F., 1953. Two person cooperative games. Econometrica 21, 128-140.

O’Neill, B., 1982. A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Mathe-
matical Social Sciences 2, 345-371.

Serrano, R., 1995. Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the
nucleolus. Journal of Mathematical Economics 24, 319-329.

Serrano, R., 2005. Fifty years of the Nash program. 1953-2003. Investiga-
ciones Economicas 29, 219-258.

Serrano, R., 2020. Sixty-seven years of the Nash program: time for retire-
ment? SERIEs. Forthcoming. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-020-
00221-5

Serrano, R., Vohra, R., 2002. Bargaining and bargaining sets. Games and
Economic Behavior 39, 292-308.

Thomson, W., 2005. Divide-and-permute. Games and Economic Behavior
52, 186-200.

Thomson, W., 2008. Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting
claims. Social Choice and Welfare 31, 667-692.

Thomson, W., 2011. Fair allocation rules, Chapter 21 in the Handbook of
Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 2, Arrow, K., Sen, A., Suzumura, K.,
eds. North Holland, 393-506

Thomson W., 2019. How to divide when there isn’t enough: from Aristotle,
the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of endowment alloca-
tion, Econometric Society Monograph. Cambridge University Press.

Tsay, M.-H., Yeh, C.-H., 2019. Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy
problems: a strategic justification perspective. Games and Economic
Behavior 113, 515-532.
20