Next Economic Analysis Seminar Series
Next Monday May 19th May 2025 at 12:00 P.M.
El próximo lunes 19 de mayo tendremos EL ÚLTIMO SEMINARIO DEL CURSO impartido por Anja Prummer (Freie Universität Berlin).
El seminario tendrá lugar a las 12:00 en la Sala de Juntas 1 del Edificio 2.
Título: "Value Design in Optimal Mechanisms"
Coautor: Francesco Nava
Resumen: A principal allocates a good to one of several agents with privately and independently distributed values, using an optimal mechanism. The principal can shape the distribution of these values by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' values either individually or jointly. We find that optimal designs are often divisive, where the good is valued only by certain agents or types. These designs typically maximize surplus. However, when surplus is fixed, less divisive designs can increase revenue.