Next Economic Analysis Seminar Series
On Monday 2nd March 2026 at 12:00 P.M.
Eli Spiegelman (Burgundy School of Business) impartirá un seminario con el título "Process exclusion: results and refinements". El seminario tendrá lugar a las 12:00 en la Sala de Juntas 1 del Edificio 2.
Coautor: Claude Fluet (Laval University)
Abstract: How does exclusion from a decision-making process influence respect for the decisions made? Experimental subjects played a 10-round linear public goods game, in which a non-deterrent penalty could be applied to uncontributed tokens, depending on votes by the individuals in a round-specific matching group. Half the participants in any session were assigned to a "privileged" group whose votes were counted more often in the determination of the fine than were those coming from the "excluded" group. To isolate the mere fact of exclusion from its discriminatory character, in an "ID" condition, the link between group and exclusion was made salient, while it was not indicated in the "No-ID" condition. We define and measure effective systemic exclusion as the difference in the effect of the fine between groups in the No-ID condition. Salient systemic exclusion, by contrast, is studied as the difference in the effect of the fine across the ID and No-ID conditions. We find no evidence that effective exclusion influences behavior in our experiment. However, salient exclusion affects both groups in different ways. Despite these results, certain design questions remain, and the presentation will end with a discussion of modifications that might make them more convincing.