El próximo lunes 4 de mayo tendremos un seminario impartido por Arnold Polanski (University of East Anglia) con el título "Strategic Security in Networks of Alliances and Rivalries". El seminario tendrá lugar a las 12:00 en la Sala de Juntas 1 del Edificio 2.
Abstract: This paper develops a network model of geopolitical security interactions in which countries are connected through both alliances and rivalries. Security is modelled as a local public good that can be either enhanced or diminished by the contributions of connected states. Countries strategically choose security expenditures and, in the endogenous-network version of the model, their geopolitical links. We characterize the interior Nash equilibrium for a fixed network and show that equilibrium contributions are related to the generalized Bonacich centralities of the network's nodes. In the endogenous-network version of the model, positive spillovers generate incentives for free-riding and decreasing the strengths of positive links, while negative spillovers generate incentives for appeasement and increasing the strengths of negative links toward zero, creating an equilibrium tendency toward reduced strategic dependence.
