A nullity axiom for games in partition function form
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46661/rev.metodoscuant.econ.empresa.11064Keywords:
Games in partition function form, Myerson value, Null players, Shapley valueAbstract
Drawing inspiration from Shapley’s foundations, Myerson (1977) proposed a unique solution for games in partition function form characterized by three axioms: linearity, symmetry, and the carrier axiom. This research aimed to determine if an alternative characterization can be reached by including a nullity axiom. As far as we know, there is not such characterization in the current literature. A proposal for a null player definition is introduced, revealing that the derived characterization is not unique. Instead, a family of parameterized solutions is presented, demonstrating the diversity of potential outcomes in this context.
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