Investment dynamics and competition in electricity generation under liberalization scenario in Peru: the importance of long-term contracts
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46661/revmetodoscuanteconempresa.2914Keywords:
investment decisions, game theory, Nash equilibrium, optimization, dynamic games, market power, oligopoly, electricity marketAbstract
We analyze the behavior of electricity generation groups that make investment and production decisions in a liberalized market scenario by introducing long-term contracts, in a context where there is a high level of market concentration. In this way, a dynamic deterministic model of imperfect competition (with open loop strategies) is used, which is solved using a system of complementary equations through GAMS software, in order to provide simulations that show the impacts of the different market structures (monopoly, oligopoly with competitive fringe, oligopoly (Cournot) and perfect competition) on the decisions of investment and production, assuming the existence of two segment loads (base and peak) and considering the existence of two technologies to be used for the electric power dispatch (hydraulic and thermal) with 2011 data for 10-year planning horizon. The results show us that although there may be indications of market power in the different analysis scenarios, there is a significant positive effect on investment in capacity, production by technology, and prices per segment loads.
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