Law Disagreements, Defeseability and Principles
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46661/revintpensampolit.7525Keywords:
law disagreements, interpretation, defeasibility, principlesAbstract
The purpose of these pages is to highlight the fact that many of the decisional disagreements are not such, but rather profound disagreements that have to do with one of the pillars of the foundations of the contemporary rule of law (democratic and constitutional), such as the submission to the law of judicial adjudication, regardless of the justice of the rule or of its application to the specific case. First, I will analyze the concept of disagreements in law, distinguishing between theoretical, interpretative, decisional and axiological disagreements. Secondly, I will focus on decisional disagreements to show that some of them are not such. These are those based on different arguments such as: a) the existence of a spurious interpretative disagreement, b) the argument based on principles and c) the argument of the defeseability of norms. These arguments are an attempt to justify the judge's disagreement on the justice of the rule or its application to the specific case, which exceeds the task entrusted to judges and questions one of the pillars of constitutional states: the submission of judicial decisions to the sources of law.
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